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Effects of a Comprehensive Computer Security Policy on 
Human Computer Security Policy Compliance 
 
Dennis C. Acuña 





Several studies contend that humans are the weakest link in computer security, as humans often engage in non-secure 
computer practices with non-malicious intent.  As a countermeasure to the vulnerability of human error in computer security, 
some studies posit that developing and maintaining a culture of computer security is essential for managing the human or 
behavioral aspect of computer security.  One aspect of computer security culture is human compliance with computer 
security policy.  However it is not well known how a comprehensive computer security policy effects human compliance 
with computer security policy, as a literature review resulted in no studies found on this topic.  For purpose of this study, 
comprehensive computer security is defined as the enterprise level convergence of information technology (IT) computer 
security and operational technology (OT) computer security.  This finding represents a gap in IS literature.  Therefore, it is 
the thesis of this study that a comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on human compliance with computer 
security policy, which can be further explained through indirect effects.   
 
Keywords 





Several studies contend that humans are the weakest link in computer security, given that humans often engage in non-secure 
computer practices with non-malicious intentions.  (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 
2012; D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001).   A non-malicious security violation (NMSV) such as 
failure to recognize phishing emails, use of weak passwords, development of non-secure program code, or failure to comply 
with computer security policies, poses a threat to computer security in the form of human error (Guo, Yuan, Archer, & 
Connelly, 2011; Willison & Warkentin, 2013).  A recent report by IBM (2014) contends that more than 95% of computer 
security incidents include some aspect of human error, while a recent report by PwC (2015) states that human error 
contributed to 50% of the single worst data breaches in 2015, an increase of 31% over the previous year.  NMSVs are 
acknowledged to represent human behavior separate from that predicated by malicious intent, with individuals engaged in 
malicious human behavior sometimes referred to as hackers, bad actors or malicious insiders (Wang, Gupta, & Rao, 2015),  
Given the modern day need for organizations to maintain uninterrupted access to information systems (IS) to achieve 
organizational objectives, human error represents a reverse salient within computer security defense-in-depth architectures 
due to the vulnerability it creates (Acuña, 2016; Dedehayir & Mäkinen, 2011; Guo et al., 2011; Hughes, 1983). 
 
As a countermeasure to the vulnerability of human error in computer security, some studies contend that developing and 
maintaining a culture of computer security is essential for managing the human, or behavioral aspect of computer security 
(Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Dhillon, Syed, & Pedron, 2016; van Niekerk & von Solms, 2010; B. von Solms, 2000).  Schein 
(2004) confirms this contention by stating that culture is an abstraction, and that organizations need to understand the forces 
that result from social and organizational situations lest they fall victim to them.  One aspect of computer security culture is 
human compliance with computer security policy (Thomson & von Solms, 2005).  Several studies have published findings on 
the effects of a computer security policy on computer security culture and compliance with computer security policy (D'Arcy 
& Hovav, 2007; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007).   
 
Thus, it is a premise of this study that human compliance with computer security policy is an element of computer security 
culture that contributes to managing the human aspect of computer security (S. H. von Solms, 2005).   For this to be true, it is 
posited that an enterprise must have an overarching computer security policy that is comprehensive in scope and ownership, 
against which all impacted humans can be held compliant.  However, no studies were found that explain the impact of a 
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comprehensive computer security policy on human computer security compliance through an understanding of its direct or 
indirect effects.   
 
For purpose of this study, a comprehensive computer security policy is defined as a top-level enterprise policy incorporating 
all aspects of enterprise computer security encompassing information technology (IT) computer security and operational 
technology (OT) computer security, as opposed to only one domain or the other.  The concept of merging IT computer 
security which is focused on information systems security with that of OT computer security which is focused on industrial 
control systems security is sometimes referred to as IT/OT convergence, and reflects a holistic approach to the practical 
management of enterprise computer security (ISACA, 2016; US-CERT Publications, 2015).   
 
This definition of a comprehensive computer security policy differs from the traditional definition of a computer security 
policy that only includes aspects of a computer security program from the IT domain, as this definition also includes all 
aspects of a computer security program from the OT domain.  As such, a comprehensive computer security policy 
encompasses all enterprise aspects of computer security thereby incorporating enterprise scope and ownership of computer 
security into a single, overarching policy that binds all humans in the enterprise to a common cause.  In doing so, the issue of 
human error is addressed through human compliance with a shared, comprehensive computer security policy which in turn is 
aligned with Schein’s (2004)  formal definition of organizational culture; “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was 
learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems.”    
 
Thesis 
It is the comprehensive nature of the computer security policy that separates this study from similar studies in this research 
domain.  Therefore, it is the thesis of this study that a comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on human 




Comprehensive Computer Security Policy 
It is not well known how a comprehensive computer security policy effects human compliance with computer security policy, 
as a literature review resulted in no studies found on this topic.  This finding represents a gap in IS literature and the 
motivation for this study, as any computer security policy to which humans are held accountable should be explainable in 
regard to the factors that influence human compliance with that policy.  It is a premise of this study that human compliance 
with computer security policy is an element of computer security culture that contributes to managing the human, or 
behavioral aspect of computer security.  In addition, it is posited that such a policy must be overarching and comprehensive in 
terms of scope and ownership, against which all impacted humans can be held compliant.  As defined by this study, a 
computer security policy must be comprehensive in scope and ownership in order to have a meaningful effect on human 
compliance with computer security policy.   
 
This study defines a comprehensive computer security policy as a top-level policy incorporating all aspects of computer 
security including research, control selection, tool selection, monitoring, incident response, and training and awareness 
practices from both the IT and OT domains.  A logical reference to the distinction between the IT domain and the OT domain 
is that described by the Reference Model for Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM), wherein the separation between the 
IT domain and the OT domain can be paraphrased as the point of demarcation between computer decision support systems 
leveraged by humans (IT),  and  computer industrial control systems that make control decisions autonomously (OT)  (CIM 
Reference Model Committee International Purdue Workshop on Industrial Computer Systems, 1989).   Recognition of this 
distinction and the effect of joining both domains into a comprehensive computer security policy are critical to understanding 
the premise of this thesis.   
 
Thus, this research is both novel and timely in its intent to better understand the factors that influence human compliance 
with a comprehensive computer security policy.   This research is novel in that no peer reviewed research was found that 
explained the direct effect of a comprehensive computer security policy on human computer security compliance through an 
understanding of its indirect effects.  This research is timely in that modern computer threats and computer vulnerabilities, 
sometimes referred to as cybersecurity, are evolving rapidly and are capable of introducing significant computer risk to an 
organization (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007; National Intelligence Council, 2008; U.S. Government, 2011; U.S. PPD-41, 2016; UK 
Government, 2016).   These beliefs are grounded in the thesis of this study that a comprehensive computer security policy has 
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a direct effect on human compliance with computer security policy, which can be further explained through indirect effects.  
As this paper represents research-in-progress, the following content includes sections comprising the research model, 
research methodology, expected results and contribution, findings and publication, and other documentation necessary to 
support this thesis.   
 
RESEARCH MODEL   
 
Theory of Planned Behavior 
The theory of planned behavior (TPB) seeks to predict and understand motivational influences on human behavior.  Defined 
by Ajzen (1991), TPB  states that human behavior is determined by factors that influence the intention to perform a specific 
behavior.  TPB consists of five constructs; subjective norms, attitude toward the behavior, perceived behavioral control, 
intention, and behavior.  Rather than model specific human behavior, TPB models human behavioral intention. The stronger 
the intention to perform the behavior, the more likely it is that the specific behavior will be performed.  Perceived behavioral 




Figure 1.  Theoretical Foundation 
 
Social Identity Theory 
Hogg, Terry, & White (1995) contend that social identity theory (SIT) is an accepted perspective on the social constructs of 
self-concept and normative behavior.  The authors also contend that SIT shares the same perspective as identity theory, with 
the primary distinction being that SIT is a proven psychology theory used to explain group processes and intergroup 
relations.  SIT is used to explain behavioral tendencies that cause people to classify themselves and others into various social 
categories such as religious affiliation, organizational recognition, gender, and age.  Ashforth & Mael (1989) posit that this 
classification gives a person the ability to segment and order the social environment into a meaningful structure, and then 
locate and define themselves in that social environment.  By socially identifying with a group, the individual is viewed as 
sharing in the group’s success and status.  Cheung & Lee (2010) contend that social identity helps to determine collective 
intention to perform a behavior.  The authors also contend that if an end user exhibits strong social identity toward a group 
behavior, then intention will increase.   
 
Interaction Theory 
Change is often met with resistance, and the introduction of change will encounter resistance from those who are held 
accountable to the change.  Markus (1983) contends that interaction theory (INT) provides a framework against which the 
introduction of change can be better managed.  INT is posited to be useful with decentralized systems when a centralized 
system is desired, and with systems that alter the balance of power in regard to those who lose power and those who gain 
power.  Kling (1980) posits that people and groups resist change introduced by system implementation due to the interaction 
between characteristics in people and characteristics related to the system.  From this perspective the greater the implied 
change, the more likely the resistance to the change.  Markus  (1983) posits that INT represents a superior method for 
developing IS implementation strategies for managing beliefs about resistance during IS implementation.   
 
Deterrence Theory 
IS studies leverage deterrence theory (DET) to explain unethical human behavior involving the use of technology in 
organizations.  DET suggests that the perceived certainty and severity of formal sanctions serves as a deterrent to committing 
an illicit act (D'Arcy & Devaraj, 2012).  D’Arcy & Devaraj contend that the threat of formal sanctions has both direct and 
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indirect influences on the intentional misuse of technology.  Hu, Xu, Dinev, & Ling (2011) report findings that contradict the 
accepted view of DET and information security by stating that behavior is influenced more by an individual’s personal ethics 
or moral compass, than the ramifications of a deterrent alone.  This aligns with Siponen & Vance (2010) who contend that 
deterrence is less effective when neutralization techniques that minimize perceived harm are detected. 
 
Theoretical Foundation 
Given the perceived influence of social identity, interaction with others, and the effect of sanction rhetoric in positively 
effecting intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy, the theoretical concepts of SIT, INT, and DET 
are incorporated into the theoretical foundation as antecedent theories to TPB (Figure 1).  This theoretical foundation 
contributes to a better understanding of human behavior and NMSVs.  This theoretical foundation also aligns with Schein’s 
formal definition of organizational culture; “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to 
be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”    
 
Hypotheses Development 
This study draws on TPB to predict human intent to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. The use of TPB 
in IS literature to predict human intent is well documented (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Flores & Ekstedt, 
2016; Guo et al., 2011; Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006; Song & Zahedi, 2005).  Based on the documented use of TPB in IS 
research, hypotheses drawn against the TPB constructs of subjective norms, attitude, and perceived behavioral control are 
included in the research model but have been modified to support this study.  These hypotheses are included for 
completeness, as the research model cannot be tested without these paths. 
 
This study also incorporates constructs drawn from SIT, INT, and DET as antecedent constructs to TPB constructs to better 
understand the indirect factors that predict human intent to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.  In doing 
so, this study makes a unique contribution to IS literature by incorporating TPB with other behavioral theories through the 
use of antecedent constructs.   
 
Drawing from the use of SIT in IS studies, Cheung & Lee (2010) leveraged SIT to measure group intention to use a social 
networking site by measuring subjective norms and social identity.  The authors contend that subjective norms reflect social 
pressure from significant others to perform a behavior, as a user tends to rely on subjective norms to decide whether or not to 
use a new technology.  The authors posit that if an end user exhibits strong social identity toward a group behavior, then 
intention will increase.  Song & Kim  (2006) synthesized the progenitor of TPB, the theory of reasoned action (TRA), and 
SIT to predict behavioral intention to use a service.  Specifically, the authors leveraged SIT, TRA, and relationships between 
the constructs of social identity and subjective norms to predict user intention.    
 
Drawing from the use of INT in IS studies, Markus (1983) posits that INT represents a superior method for managing beliefs 
about resistance to change, and that INT offers a superior theory for managing the resistance encountered during information 
system implementation.  INT is posited to be useful with decentralized systems when a centralized system is desired, and 
with systems that alter the balance of power in regard to those who lose power and those who gain power.   
  
Drawing from the use of DET in IS studies yields mixed results.  While several studies contend that enforcement activities 
are an important part of any information security culture, IS studies incorporating DET have revealed positive and negative 
influences on intention.  D’Arcy & Devaraj (2012) contend that the threat of formal sanctions has direct and indirect 
influences on an individual’s intention to misuse information assets.  Herath & Rao (2009) posit that sanctions are an 
effective mechanism in reducing negative behavior and exhibit a positive influence on social behavior.  Johnston, Warkentin, 
& Siponen (2015) contend sanction rhetoric that emphasizes the impact of both personal relevance and IS relevance provides 
a positive influence on intention to comply with information security policy, confirming that sanction rhetoric  influences 
human intention.    
 
Path Diagram 
Therefore, based on the usage pattern of TPB, SIT, INT, and DET in IS research, the research model for this study leverages 
a modified version of TPB to measure the factors that influence human intention to comply with a comprehensive computer 
security policy.  The traditional TPB constructs of subjective norms, attitude, and perceived behavioral control are modeled 
in expected form as independent variables against a construct of intention as the dependent variable.  New constructs of 
comprehensive computer security policy, social identity with organizational others, resistance to policy compliance, and 
perceived effect of sanctions for non-compliance are incorporated as antecedent constructs to TPB to further measure the 
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predictability of human intent to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.  The path diagram shown in Figure 
2 models the inclusion of TPB constructs, new SIT, INT, DET, and comprehensive computer security policy antecedent 
constructs, 3 indirect (mediating) paths, 1 direct path, 6 control (moderating) variables, 10 research hypotheses, 1 dependent 
variable (intention to comply), several independent variables, 1 exogenous construct (comprehensive computer security 








Survey Instrument and Data Collection 
The research methodology for this study includes the collection of data using a survey instrument, and analysis of the 
collected data using multivariate data analysis techniques (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2009; Kumar, 2005; Trochim & 
Donnelly, 2008).  The survey instrument will utilize a unipolar 7-point Likert scale for measurement (Ajzen, 1991).  Where 
possible, use case scenarios and questions for the survey instrument will be drawn from previous studies conducted in this 
research domain (Flores & Ekstedt, 2016; Guo et al., 2011; Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006).   Six control variables are planned for 
this study; age, gender, education, IT/OT identity, years of professional computer experience, and industry sector. 
 
Questionnaire distribution and data collection will be performed by Qualtrics (2016), a commercial Internet service that 
specializes in survey based research.  Although the survey instrument will be modeled after IS studies that leveraged TPB 
survey research, a pilot survey will be conducted prior to the primary data survey to ensure robustness.  The target population 
for this study is authorized users located in the United States, randomly selected from defined industry sectors.   It is the 
intention of this study that all identifiers capable of linking a response to a participant, including Internet Protocol (IP) 
address, will be hidden and unknown to the principal investigator.   
 
Sample Size 
Hair et al. (2009) recommend a sample size of 100 to 400 observations for SEM studies.  The most common SEM estimation 
procedure is maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) which supports a minimum sample size of 50, but recommends a sample 
size of 200 to provide a sound basis for estimation.  Sample sizes greater than 400 become sensitive to meaningless 
differences resulting in goodness-of-fit (GOF) measures that suggest a poor fit.  Therefore, based on MLE recommendations, 
a sample size of 200 (minimum) to 250 (maximum) responses is targeted for this study.  A maximum of 250 responses 




Multivariate data analysis techniques to be performed on the collected data include confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and 
structural equation modeling (SEM).  CFA and SEM are often used together to measure the validity of a research model, to 
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determine whether or not the estimated model fits the observed model.  CFA is a statistical test used to determine how well 
the factors described by the theoretical model match the reality of data gathered by the study observations.  SEM is a family 
of statistical models used to explain relationship strength between the multiple variables that are linked together in a path 
diagram (Figure 2).  SEM performs this task by examining relationships between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable in a path diagram as a series of equations similar to a series of multiple regression equations.   
 
SEM and CFA analyses can be performed using one of several computer software packages.  This study will use the LISREL 
(LInear Structural RELations) computer programming language to perform CFA and SEM analyses.  While SEM models 
such as the TPB Base Research Model with Antecedent Constructs depicted in Figure 2 are often drawn using simplified path 
diagrams to describe dependence relationships between independent (exogenous) and dependent (endogenous) variables, 
SEM models can also be drawn using a lexicon known as LISREL notation.  Although LISREL  refers specifically to a 
widely used computer program for SEM modeling, the LISREL platform includes a unique lexicon known as LISREL 
notation to depict and describe SEM models (Hair et al., 2009).    
 
Goodness-of-Fit  
SEM goodness-of-fit (GOF) measurement compares theory to reality by comparing the difference between the estimated 
covariance matrix, or theory, to the observed covariance matrix, or reality  (Hair et al., 2009).  If the modeled theory is 
perfect then a comparison of the estimated covariance matrix and the observed covariance matrix will show no difference, a 
perfect fit, between the two matrices.  For SEM, the implied null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the 
estimated covariance matrix, or theory, and the observed covariance matrix, or reality, meaning that the research model is a 
good fit with reality.  One statistic used to measure variance between the two matrices is chi-square (χ
2
).  Given that the value 
of χ
2
 increases as the variance between the two matrices increases, we also reference the p-value associated with χ
2
 to assess 
the equality of the estimated covariance matrix and the observed covariance matrix within a given population (Hair et al., 
2009).  This leads to desired critical values of a relatively small χ
2
 value that approaches zero (0), and a correspondingly large 
p-value that approaches one (1).   
 
However, due to known problems using χ
2
 as a test statistic for SEM GOF, Hair et al. (2009) suggest that SEM studies report 
at least one absolute GOF index and one incremental GOF index in addition to χ
2
.  Absolute GOF indexes include χ
2
, root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the goodness-of-fit index (GFI).   Incremental GOF indexes include the 
normed fit index (NFI), and the comparative fit index (CFI).   
 
EXPECTED RESULTS AND CONTRIBUTION 
 
Expected Results 
The thesis of this study is that a comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on human compliance with 
computer security policy, which can be further explained through indirect effects.  It is a premise of this study that human 
compliance with computer security policy is an element of computer security culture that contributes to managing the human 
aspect of computer security.  This study is both novel and timely in its intent to better understand the factors that influence 
human compliance with a comprehensive computer security policy, and minimize the vulnerability that is human error.   It is 
anticipated that the statistical findings of this study will support these beliefs and will benefit researchers and practitioners in 
several ways.   
 
Contribution 
First, this research represents a contribution to IS literature in that no peer reviewed research was found that explains the 
direct effect of a comprehensive computer security policy on human computer security compliance through an understanding 
of its indirect effects.  This study also contributes to IS literature in that it incorporates new antecedent constructs from SIT, 
INT, and DET with traditional TPB constructs to better understand the factors that influence human intent to comply with a 
comprehensive computer security policy.  Completion of this study will provide researchers with a descriptive understanding 
of the direct and indirect effects on human intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.   
 
Second, the prescriptive application of a shared comprehensive computer security policy will have a positive impact on 
enterprise computer security awareness and reduced human error.  A better understanding of the practical benefits of 
compliance with a comprehensive computer security policy will lead to improved computer security awareness, which will 
help manage the resistance to change that is often encountered when change alters the perception of power in regard to those 
who lose power and those who gain power.  Improved computer security awareness will also contribute to an increase in self-
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efficacy and personal intent to comply with such a policy, resulting in the direct effect of reduced human error and fewer 
occurrences of NMSVs.  
 
Third, this research is timely in that modern computer threats and computer vulnerabilities are evolving rapidly and are 
capable of introducing significant risk to both the IT computer domain and the OT computer domain.  Publication of this 
study will help draw attention to the practical need for convergence of IT computer security and OT computer security.  This 
contribution is underscored by the notion that theory is not the exclusive domain of academia, but can also be found in the 
experience and practice gathered through the observation of real world behavior (Hair et al., 2009; Lee, 1999).   
 
Lastly, the practical application of these findings will benefit the enterprise by helping to develop a comprehensive culture of 
computer security by incorporating enterprise scope and ownership of computer security into a single, overarching policy that 
binds all humans in the enterprise to a common cause. The findings from this study will reinforce Schein’s contention that 
culture is an abstraction, and that organizations need to understand the forces that result from social and organizational 
situations lest they fall victim to them.  In addition, the findings will contribute to the ongoing development and persistence 
of organizational culture as defined by Schein; “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved 
its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, 
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”   
 
FINDINGS AND PUBLICATION 
 
There are no findings to report at this time as this paper represents research-in-progress.  A research application has been 
filed with the Dakota State University (DSU) Institutional Review Board (IRB).  The data collection phase is scheduled to 
begin in 1Q2017, which will be followed by the data analysis phase.  Completion of this study is scheduled for 2Q2017.  
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